BYU Law Review
Volume 2011 | Issue 1

Article 3

3-1-2011

Goldilocks and the Three-Judge Panel: Spencer v.
World Vision, Inc. and the Religious Organization
Exemption of Title VII
Brandon S. Boulter

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons,
and the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Brandon S. Boulter, Goldilocks and the Three-Judge Panel: Spencer v. World Vision, Inc. and the Religious Organization Exemption of Title
VII, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 33 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2011/iss1/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

DO NOT DELETE

4/5/2011 7:41 PM

Goldilocks and the Three-Judge Panel: Spencer v.
World Vision, Inc. and the Religious Organization
Exemption of Title VII
I. INTRODUCTION
In Spencer v. World Vision, Inc. a three-judge panel for the Ninth
Circuit faced the question of whether a self-described “Christian
humanitarian organization”1 qualified for an exemption from Title
VII’s prohibition of religiously-based employment discrimination. In
a split decision, the Ninth Circuit found that World Vision did meet
the qualifications for the religious organization exemption, thereby
precluding any legal challenges for religiously motivated employment
discrimination. Although both judges in the majority agreed with
this conclusion, each used a very different test to reach it.
Additionally, the lone dissenting judge formulated her own unique
test, which, if applied, would greatly limit the scope of Title VII’s
religious organization exemption. This “Goldilocksian” trio of
possible tests, each more restrictive than the last, naturally gives rise
to the question of which if any of the three tests is “just right.”
This Note argues that although the Ninth Circuit reached the
correct conclusion, the test used by the majority is too broad in
scope, creating an over-inclusive exemption to the religious
discrimination prohibitions of Title VII. The test used in the
dissenting opinion, on the other hand, is too narrow. Although it
would be too much to say the test used in the concurrence is “just
right,” it is the most appropriate of the three because it most
effectively accommodates existing precedential constraints governing
the religious organization exemption and strikes the most
appropriate balance between protecting individual rights and the
rights of religious entities.
In arguing for this moderate approach to the religious
organization exemption of Title VII, this Note proceeds as follows.
Part II explains the facts and procedural history of Spencer. Part III
provides an overview of Title VII’s religious organization exemption

1. Who We Are, WORLD VISION, http://www.worldvision.org/content.nsf/about/
who-we-are (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
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and relevant case law. Part IV summarizes the reasoning of each
member of Spencer’s three-judge panel. Part V analyzes the three
tests against the backdrop of existing precedent and constitutional
and statutory requirements. Part VI concludes.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2006, World Vision, Inc., a global humanitarian organization,
terminated three of its longtime employees because they “denied the
deity of Jesus Christ and disavowed the doctrine of the Trinity.”2
World Vision, whose mission includes “serv[ing] the poor as a
demonstration of God’s unconditional love for all people,”3 requires
all prospective employees to “agree with World Vision’s Statement of
Faith and/or the Apostles’ Creed,” both of which profess, among
other things, a belief in the deity of God the Father and Jesus
Christ.4 At the time they were hired, each of the plaintiffs
“confirmed that they ‘subscribe[d], wholeheartedly to the principles
inherent’” in these statements.5 After several years of employment,
however, each of the “[p]laintiffs discontinued their attendance at
daily devotions and weekly chapels held during the workday.”6 Upon
learning of this apparent lapse in devotion, World Vision
representatives interviewed the plaintiffs and determined that each, in
fact, “denied the deity of Jesus Christ.”7 Because this denial was
clearly contrary to World Vision’s Statement of Faith and the
Apostles’ Creed on which employment at World Vision was
conditioned, the plaintiffs were terminated.8
Following their termination, plaintiffs filed suit with a U.S.
district court, alleging employment discrimination.9 This complaint
was later amended10 to include the claim that the plaintiffs’
termination was based on religious “discrimination in violation of
2. Spencer v. World Vision, Inc. (Spencer II), 619 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).
3. Job Opportunities at World Vision, WORLD VISION, http://www.worldvision.org/
content.nsf/about/hr-home?Open&lpos=lft_txt_Careers (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
4. Christian
Commitment,
WORLD
VISION,
http://www.worldvision.org/
content.nsf/about/hr-faith (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
5. Spencer v. World Vision, Inc. (Spencer I), 570 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1282 (W.D.
Wash. 2008) (citation omitted).
6. Id. (citation omitted).
7. Spencer II, 619 F.3d at 1111.
8. Id.
9. Spencer I, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1280.
10. Id. at 1281.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.”11 Shortly thereafter, World Vision
responded by filing a motion to dismiss, which was later converted
into a motion for summary judgment.12 World Vision argued that
“as a religious organization it is exempt from the religious
discrimination provisions of Title VII.”13 The plaintiffs disagreed,
arguing that World Vision could not qualify as a religious
organization and should not, therefore, be exempted from the
requirements of Title VII.14 In the end, the district court agreed with
World Vision, granting summary judgment in World Vision’s favor
and finding that it qualified for the religious organization exemption
provided for in Title VII.15
III. TITLE VII’S RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION EXEMPTION
In order to provide an appropriate framework in which to
evaluate the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Spencer II, this section
reviews the language and purpose of Title VII’s religious
organization exemption as well as the Ninth Circuit cases on which
the panel relied to guide its decision. The cases include EEOC v.
Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co. and EEOC v.
Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate.
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
In 1964, Congress passed what has been billed as “the most
comprehensive civil rights legislation ever enacted” in the United
States.16 In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended
to curb “discrimination on account of race, color, religion, and
national origin, in a broad variety of contexts, including . . .
discrimination in employment.”17 The provisions governing
employment discrimination are found in Title VII of the Act, which
“makes it unlawful for an employer ‘to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against an individual with respect to his

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Spencer II, 619 F.3d at 1111.
Id.
Spencer I, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1280.
Id.
Id. at 1289; see also Spencer II, 619 F.3d at 1126.
Richard K. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
31 BROOK. L. REV. 62, 62 (1964).
17. Id.
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compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.’”18 Despite this seemingly clear proscription on employment
discrimination, Congress created a fairly broad exemption for certain
religious entities in an effort to “prevent excessive government
entanglement” with religion and preserve “the constitutionallyprotected interest of religious organizations in making religiouslymotivated employment decisions.”19 The Civil Rights Act provides
that “[t]his subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities.”20 Thus, this
exemption left a significant group of entities outside the scope of
Title VII’s ban on religious-based employment discrimination.
In creating this exemption, however, Congress failed to provide a
clear definition of what constitutes a “religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society” within the context of
Title VII.21 As such, it has largely been left to the courts to decide
which entities qualify for the so-called “religious organization
exemption” and which do not. Spencer II, like many cases before it,
addressed this issue. Following are two of the most important cases22
considered by both the district court and the Ninth Circuit in
reaching their decisions in the Spencer cases.
B. EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co.
In EEOC v. Townley, the Ninth Circuit considered a religious
discrimination claim filed by Louis Pelvas, a machinist who had been
fired by Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Company
18. Spencer I, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1283 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)).
19. Id. (quoting Hall v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 623 (6th Cir.
2000)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
21. Id.
22. Importantly, the Spencer II court also relied heavily on the Third Circuit’s reasoning
in Leboon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2007). In Leboon the
Third Circuit formulated a factor test to be used to determine whether or not an entity
qualifies as a religious organization for the purposes of the Title VII exemption. This test was
based largely on the Ninth Circuit cases discussed below, EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co.,
859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988), and EEOC v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458
(9th Cir. 1993).
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(“Townley”).23 Townley, a Florida-based company, manufactured
equipment used in the mining industry.24 At the time they founded
the company, the owners, who were born-again Christians, “made a
covenant with God that their business would be a Christian, faithoperated business.”25 This covenant was evident in the company’s
business practices of including gospel messages in outgoing mail and
on official company documents, as well as providing financial aid to
churches and missionaries.26 Additionally, the company held “a
devotional service once a week during work hours.”27
When Pelvas was hired in 1979, no weekly devotional service was
being held at the Eloy, Arizona plant where he was employed.28
However, in 1982 an employee handbook was distributed, which
stated, “All employees are required to attend the nondenominational devotional services each Tuesday. Employees are
paid for their time while attending these services.”29 Although Pelvas
initially agreed to abide by this condition of employment—going so
far as to sign a statement confirming his willingness to attend such
services—he soon made a request to be exempted from these services
on the basis that he was an atheist.30 Following a denial of his
request, Pelvas filed a religious discrimination complaint with the
EEOC, which led to the EEOC filing an action in federal court
against Townley.31 The district court reviewed this action and
granted summary judgment against Townley, finding that the
company had violated Title VII “by requiring its employees to
attend devotional services”32 and “by failing to accommodate Pelvas’
objection to attending the services.”33 The district court also “issued
a permanent injunction prohibiting Townley from continuing the
mandatory devotional services.”34

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

859 F.2d at 612.
Id. at 611.
Id. at 611–12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 612.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding
that Townley’s employment practices did, in fact, violate Title VII.35
This decision hinged on the court’s determination that, contrary to
Townley’s assertions, the company did not qualify for the religious
organization exemption provided for in Title VII.36 In making this
determination, the court noted that case law interpreting the scope
of the religious organization exemption was “not very helpful.”37 As
such, the court was left largely to its own devices to make the
determination regarding Townley’s status. Rather than create a clear
test to perform this analysis, the Ninth Circuit simply stated that
“each case must turn on its own facts. All significant religious and
secular characteristics must be weighed to determine whether the
corporation’s purpose and character are primarily religious.”38 Under
this fairly flexible standard, the court concluded that Townley’s
“primarily secular” nature disqualified it from the religious
organization exemption of Title VII.39 As such, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment against
Townley.
C. EEOC v. Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate
In 1993, the Ninth Circuit once again considered the parameters
of Title VII’s religious organization exemption in EEOC v.
Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate.40 In contrast to Townley, which
involved a corporation, Kamehameha involved a review of the
religious nature of two schools whose employment policy required
all teachers to be of the Protestant religion.41 The dispute in
Kamehameha arose when Carole Edgerton, a non-Protestant,
applied for a position with the schools but was denied employment
based on the Protestant-only policy.42 Edgerton subsequently filed a
complaint with the EEOC, which in turn filed suit in federal court
against the schools.43 On appeal, however, a three-judge panel for
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

38

Id. at 613.
Id. at 613, 617–19.
Id. at 618.
Id.
Id. at 619.
990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 459.
Id.
Id.
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the Ninth Circuit unanimously reversed the district court’s decision,
finding that “the Schools failed to establish their entitlement to” the
Title VII exemptions.44 The Ninth Circuit arrived at this conclusion
by considering six factors it believed were relevant to distinguishing a
religious entity from a secular one.45 These factors included: “(1)
ownership and affiliation, (2) purpose, (3) faculty, (4) student body,
(5) student activities, and (6) curriculum.”46 After considering each
of these in turn, the court determined that the schools could not
qualify as religious organizations under the Title VII exemption.
IV. SPENCER V. WORLD VISION, INC.
A. Judge O’Scannlain’s Majority Opinion
In a split decision, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit upheld a grant of summary judgment by the
district court, holding that World Vision qualified for the religious
organization exemption under Title VII and could not, therefore, be
liable for religiously-based employment discrimination. Writing for
the majority, Judge O’Scannlain began his opinion by noting that
“[t]ypically, the question of whether an organization is religious for
purposes of section 2000e-1 warrants little analysis.”47 Spencer II,
however, provided a rare instance in which the answer to that
question was not so obvious. According to Judge O’Scannlain, the
Ninth Circuit had previously reviewed only two cases in which the
answer to this question was not readily apparent—Townley and
Kamehameha.48 Because neither of these cases had established a clear
test to govern determinations such as this, the Spencer II court was
left to fill the gaps, leading each member of the three-judge panel to
formulate his or her own governing test.
Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion was framed in large part by the
relatively vague parameters of both Townley and Kamehameha. On
the one hand, the Townley decision established a fairly broad scope of
analysis, holding that “‘each case must turn on its own facts . . .
44. Id. at 460.
45. Id. at 461–63; see also Spencer v. World Vision, Inc. (Spencer I), 570 F. Supp. 2d
1279, 1284 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (utilizing the six factors set forth in Kamehameha), aff’d, 619
F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2010).
46. Spencer I, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.
47. Spencer v. World Vision Inc. (Spencer II), 619 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010).
48. See id.
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[with a court weighing] [a]ll significant religious and secular
characteristics . . . to determine whether the corporation’s purpose
and character are primarily religious.’”49 On the other hand, as
conceded by Judge O’Scannlain, “there is no denying that [the
Kamehameha court] held that section 2000e-1 should be construed
‘narrowly.’”50 Taking these together, Judge O’Scannlain believed
that the court was simply required “to analyze, on a case-by-case
basis, whether the ‘general picture’ of an organization is ‘primarily
religious,’ taking into account ‘[a]ll significant religious and secular
characteristics.’”51 Judge O’Scannlain rejected the calls by both
parties in this case to apply a strict “factor test” like those found in
Kamehameha or Leboon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center
Ass’n,52 as he believed such a test could run afoul of the clear
requirements of the First Amendment’s religion clauses.53
“[T]he Free Exercise Clause,” noted Judge O’Scannlain,
“‘clearly’ protects ‘organizations less pervasively religious than
churches.’”54 Accordingly, Judge O’Scannlain refused to establish a
factor test that would narrowly construe the category of religious
organizations described in Title VII’s exemption.55 Additionally, the
Establishment Clause demands “neutrality among religious
groups,”56 meaning that “[t]he very act of [determining what
activities do or do not have religious meaning] runs counter to the
‘core of the [Establishment Clause].’”57 Judge O’Scannlain found
support for this principle in Justice Brennan’s concurrence from
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, which argued that “‘determining whether
an activity is religious or secular requires a searching case-by-case
analysis . . . [, which] results in considerable ongoing government
entanglement in religious affairs . . . [and] raises [the] concern that

49. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir.
1988)).
50. Id. at 1114.
51. Id. (quoting Townley, 859 F.2d at 618; EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate,
990 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1993) (alteration in original)).
52. See supra note 22.
53. Spencer II, 619 F.3d at 1115–19.
54. Id. (quoting Townley, 859 F.2d at 620 n.15).
55. Id. at 1113.
56. Id. at 1114.
57. Id. at 1116 (quoting New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977)).
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a religious organization may be chilled in its free exercise activity.’”58
Based on this reasoning, Judge O’Scannlain elected to form his own
test, which he claimed “minimizes any untoward differentiation
among religious organizations and any unseemly judicial inquiry into
whether an activity is religious or secular in nature.”59 Under Judge
O’Scannlain’s test:
[A] nonprofit entity qualifies for the section 2000e-1 exemption if
it establishes that it 1) is organized for a self-identified religious
purpose (as evidenced by Articles of Incorporation or similar
foundational documents), 2) is engaged in activity consistent with,
and in furtherance of, those religious purposes, and 3) holds itself
out to the public as religious.60

Applying this test, which “permits an institution to acknowledge
its own religiosity” by “evaluat[ing] the purpose provided by the
organization against the organization’s practice,”61 Judge
O’Scannlain found that World Vision did qualify as a religious
organization under Title VII and upheld summary judgment in its
favor.62
B. Judge Kleinfeld’s Concurring Opinion
Although Judge Kleinfeld agreed with Judge O’Scannlain’s
ultimate finding, he disagreed with the test Judge O’Scannlain
applied, believing it to be “too inclusive.”63 From Judge Kleinfeld’s
perspective, “Judge O’Scannlain’s test is too broad because it would
allow nonprofit institutions with church affiliations to use their
affiliations as a cover for religious discrimination in secular
employment.”64 Judge Kleinfeld feared reliance on this test would
force “courts to look into the hearts of [executives] and make a
judgment about their real purposes.”65 To avoid the need for such an

58. Id. (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 343–44 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
59. Id. at 1119.
60. Id. (citing Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1126.
63. Id. at 1127 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 1130.
65. Id. at 1132.
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“impractical” approach, Judge Kleinfeld proposed a test based on
“one big objectively ascertainable difference: how [the
organizations] charge.”66 Thus, under Judge Kleinfeld’s formulation:
To determine whether an entitity is a “religious corporation,
association, or society,” [a court must] determine whether it is
organized for a religious purpose, is engaged primarily in carrying
out that religious purpose, holds itself out to the public as an entity
for carrying out that religious purpose, and does not engage
primarily or substantially in the exchange of goods or services for
money beyond nominal amounts.67

In Judge Kleinfeld’s opinion, centering analysis on this final
characteristic would allow a court to distinguish organizations
“designed to exchange goods or services for money, from those
designed to give them away except perhaps for nominal charges in
order to serve a religious objective.”68 Even under this formulation,
concluded Judge Kleinfeld, World Vision would qualify as a religious
corporation.69
C. Judge Berzon’s Dissenting Opinion
In her dissent, Judge Berzon rejected both tests proposed by her
colleagues as too expansive, fearing both “would transform what has
always been a narrow exemption from the general prohibition on
religious discrimination into an exceedingly broad one, with no
obvious stopping point.”70 Based on her narrow reading of Title
VII’s religious organization exemption, Judge Berzon would apply
the exemption only to those organizations whose “primary
activity . . . consists of voluntary gathering for prayer and religious
learning.”71

66. Id. (explaining that, while a “hospital gets money by exchanging valuable services
for their market value in cash,” “[t]he Salvation Army gives its homeless shelter and soup
kitchen services away, or charges nominal fees, perhaps eight dollars a night for a bed worth
fifty dollars a night”).
67. Id. at 1133.
68. Id. at 1132.
69. Id. at 1133.
70. Id. at 1134 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 1148.
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V. ANALYSIS

Given the various legal constraints facing the Ninth Circuit
panel—including the parameters of prior precedent and the
competing interests of freedom of religion and individual
employment rights—it is not surprising that the formation of a new
test governing the scope of Title VII’s religious organization
exemption was no easy task. As a result of this difficulty, the court
failed to reach a consensus on the appropriate test for such a
determination, leaving each member of the panel to cling to his or
her own unique formulation. Although the ultimate outcome of
Spencer II was correct, the test used in the majority opinion was not
the most appropriate of the three. Of the three tests proposed in
Spencer II, Judge Kleinfeld’s formulation most effectively balances
the competing interests of the religion clauses of the First
Amendment and the individual employment rights mandated under
Title VII, while still accounting for the demands of prior precedent.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit should adopt Judge Kleinfeld’s test,
or some slight variation thereof, to govern future decisions regarding
the application of Title VII’s religious organization exemption.
A. Accommodating Ninth Circuit Precedent
Townley and Kamehameha established the precedential
parameters for cases involving the religious organization exemption
of Title VII in the Ninth Circuit. Together these cases stand for the
principles that “[a]ll significant religious and secular characteristics
must be weighed to determine whether the [organization’s] purpose
and character are primarily religious,”72 and “that section 2000e-1
[sh]ould be construed ‘narrowly.’”73 Using these principles as the
governing standard, of the three possible tests found in Spencer II,
Judge Kleinfeld’s formulation represents the most appropriate
accommodation of the precedential demands of both Townley and
Kamehameha. Whereas Judge O’Scannlain’s test is too over-inclusive
in actual effect to meet the narrowness requirement of Kamehameha,
Judge Berzon’s test is too narrow to allow for the weighing of “[a]ll

72. Id. at 1112 (majority opinion) (quoting EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859
F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988)).
73. Id. at 1112 (quoting EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458,
460 (9th Cir. 1993)).
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significant religious characteristics” required by Townley.74 As such,
Judge Kleinfeld’s middle-of-the-road approach, though far from
perfect, is truest to the demands of Ninth Circuit precedent.
Although Judge O’Scannlain’s desire to allow “institution[s] to
acknowledge [their] own religiosity”75 is a worthy theoretical goal to
allow for greater religious freedom, in actual application this test may
prove to be much too over-inclusive to fit within the precedential
parameters of Kamehameha. As noted in both the concurrence and
the dissent,76 by relying on so-called “neutral factors” for
determining whether or not an organization is “religious,” Judge
O’Scannlain’s test runs the risk of placing too much power in the
hands of those organizations. This may allow secular entities to
redefine themselves as “religious” and thereby receive undeserved
exemption from certain requirements of Title VII, a problem which
Kamehameha’s narrowness requirement undoubtedly seeks to avoid.
Judge Kleinfeld’s test, though similar to Judge O’Scannlain’s in
many regards, places important limits on the power of organizations
to redefine themselves as religious by allowing the court to
objectively review whether an organization “engage[s] primarily or
substantially in the exchange of goods or services for money beyond
nominal amounts.”77 This addition tempers Judge O’Scannlain’s
formulation of the test, bringing it more in line with the
“narrowness” requirement of Kamehameha. Additionally, Judge
Kleinfeld’s shift away from Judge O’Scannlain’s focus on nonprofit
status allows the court to more fully review “[a]ll significant religious
characteristics” of organizations that may in fact be religious but lack
the “corporate papers and nonprofit status” Judge O’Scannlain’s test
demands.78
Judge Kleinfeld’s test also avoids the narrowness problems of
Judge Berzon’s formulation. Judge Berzon argues for a very limited
reading of the phrase “religious organization,” effectively excluding
from that classification all entities whose primary purpose is not
limited to “voluntary gathering for prayer and religious learning.”79
Such a narrow reading would force the court to ignore many other
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

44

See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
Id. at 1119.
See id. at 1130 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring); id. at 1133–34 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1133 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
Id. at 1130.
Id. at 1148 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
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obviously religious characteristics of an organization, thereby
running contrary to the requirements of Townley. Judge Berzon’s
test could also run the risk of withholding the exemption from
“‘clearly’ religious” organizations simply because such organizations
engage in activities that are not limited to prayer and religious
learning.80 For instance, in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, the Court
reviewed a Title VII claim involving a church’s decision to terminate
an employee from a church owned gym.81 The Court upheld
application of Title VII’s exemption to the seemingly secular
activities of this clearly religious organization, noting that “it is a
significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain
of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court
will consider religious.”82 Judge Berzon’s test would fail to provide
adequate deference to a large category of religious organizations
whose functions include, in addition to voluntary prayer and
religious learning, activities that might be viewed by a court as
secular or nonreligious. Judge Kleinfeld’s test, however, avoids such
problems by allowing the court to review “[a]ll significant religious
characteristics” of an organization, which, as in the case of World
Vision or The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, will often
include much more than prayer and study.
B. Balancing the Interests of Freedom of Religion and Individual
Employment Rights
Apart from effectively accommodating the established Ninth
Circuit precedents, Judge Kleinfeld’s test also more effectively
balances the competing interests of the First Amendment’s religion
clauses and the protection of individual employment rights provided
for in Title VII.83 History has demonstrated that “whenever religious
80. Id. at 1112 (majority opinion).
81. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
82. Id. at 337.
83. For a discussion on why these interests come into conflict, see Duane E. Okamoto,
Comment, Religious Discrimination and the Title VII Exemption for Religious Organizations:
A Basic Values Analysis for the Proper Allocation of Conflicting Rights, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
1375, 1379 (1987) (“On the one hand, allowing a religious group to practice religious
discrimination in employment matters advances first amendment [sic] goals by allowing
religious groups to keep their beliefs intact. On the other hand, however, allowing a religious
group to discriminate may seriously infringe upon the individual employee’s right to be free
from discrimination, including discrimination based on religion.).
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groups act as employers, the possibility exists that the groups’
religious rights will conflict with individual employees’ liberty
rights.”84 Such conflicts raise significant challenges for reviewing
courts given the fact that they must find a way to balance
constitutional rights against rights guaranteed by what has been
called “the most important civil rights legislation in American
history.”85 Because any increase in one of those rights often comes at
the expense of the other, any test formulated by the courts will often
sacrifice one right for the other in attempting to create a workable
standard.
Such was the case in Spencer II. Judge O’Scannlain’s test, in an
effort to avoid infringing on religious liberty—certainly a very worthy
goal—created a test that could allow largely secular entities to
infringe upon individual employment rights by escaping Title VII’s
prohibition on discrimination in the workplace. On the other end of
the spectrum, Judge Berzon’s test would greatly hamper the rights
of religious organizations in favor of giving greater protection for
employees. Both results would represent an unfortunate imbalance in
the natural conflict between these competing rights. Judge
Kleinfeld’s test, although imperfect in other regards, provides a
middle-of-the-road approach that would likely create a more
workable balance between these interests. By allowing religious
organizations to demonstrate their truly religious nature through
largely objective standards, Judge Kleinfeld’s test significantly
protects religious freedom. However, by requiring a review of the
extent and nature of an organization’s money making operations,
Judge Kleinfeld’s test also provides protection for employees by
making it less likely that a predominantly secular organization can
take advantage of Title VII’s religious organization exemption.
C. Potential Shortcomings of Judge Kleinfeld’s Test
Importantly, although Judge Kleinfeld’s test is the most effective
of the three tests created in Spencer II, it does raise its own concerns.
Because it involves a review of an organization’s “exchange of goods
or services,”86 Judge Kleinfeld’s test runs the risk of bumping up
against the strict restraints of the Establishment Clause and entering
84. Id. at 1379.
85. GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1 (3d ed. 2010).
86. Spencer v. World Vision, Inc. (Spencer II), 619 F.3d 1109, 1133 (9th Cir. 2010).
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what Judge O’Scannlain called a “constitutional minefield.”87
Because “the prospect of church and state litigating in court about
what does or does not have religious meaning touches the very core
of the constitutional guarantee against religious establishment,”88 the
courts have long been reluctant to penetrate the traditional “wall of
separation”89 between church and state. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the
Supreme Court established the primary test for determining when
the government has violated the Establishment Clause. Under one of
the prongs of the Lemon test, the Establishment Clause is violated “if
there is excessive government entanglement with religion,” which
may exist where the government requires a “comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance.”90 Fear of such
entanglement has led the government to take a largely hands-off
approach in many situations involving churches and religious
organizations in order to avoid the appearance of a “continuing state
surveillance.”91 In its most basic application, Judge Kleinfeld’s test
may not require such continuing surveillance, but reviewing courts
would be wise to avoid such a searching inquiry that would begin to
implicate establishment issues. Through such avoidance, courts can
continue to protect the ever-important religious rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit faced an unenviable challenge in Spencer v.
World Vision, Inc. It is no easy task to formulate a workable test that
remains faithful to existing precedent while appropriately balancing
the religious freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment and the
individual employment rights protected under Title VII. Although
the final holding in Spencer II was correct, two of the three tests
formulated by the court failed to effectively deal with the competing

87. Id. at 1115.
88. New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 132–33 (1977).
89. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802)
in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984); see also Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (“The First Amendment has erected a wall between church
and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable.”).
90. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613, 619 (1971).
91. See NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN FABEAN CHERRY, TAX EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2008) for a discussion of the government’s
treatment of tax-exempt religious organizations.
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interests and precedential constraints associated with the religious
organization exemption of Title VII. Although it would be a stretch
to say Judge Kleinfeld’s test is “just right,” of the three possible tests,
his formulation strikes the most appropriate balance of the important
competing rights at issue and should therefore guide the Ninth
Circuit in future determinations regarding Title VII’s religious
organization exemption.
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